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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for white-collar crime
23 results foundAuthor: Stadler, William Andrew Title: Empirical Examination of the “Special Sensitivity” to Imprisonment Hypothesis Summary: Quantitative research concerning white-collar offenders has received little attention in recent years. Research that has been conducted has primarily focused on the social and behavioral characteristics of these individuals, as well as the etiology of white-collar offending. In this regard, comparisons have been drawn between conventional street offenders and those convicted or sentenced for white-collar offenses with respect to demographic, social, and criminal history information. However, virtually no research has investigated the attributes and experiences of white-collar inmate within the prison environment. Moreover, there have been few attempts to draw comparisons among samples of imprisoned white-collar offenders and their street offender counterparts. While informative, studies that have examined incarcerated white-collar offenders have largely been guided by a qualitative research methodology that does little to inform the predictive validity of white-collar offender characteristics with respect to their subsequent prison experiences. As a result, the hypothesis that white-collar offenders are particularly sensitive to prison environments, because they are thought to be from backgrounds of privilege and hold higher rank on the social status spectrum, has remained untested. Because of this lack of research, the view that white-collar offenders experience more frequent and significant prison adjustment problems in the form of physical and mental health harms, social isolation, victimization, and institutional misconducts largely remains unchallenged. However, more rigorous investigation of the experiences of incarcerated white-collar offenders could have far-reaching implications with respect to how the justice system wishes to sanction white-collar offenders, how correctional facilities might go about addressing the needs of this special inmate population, and how the prison experience might impact the lives of white-collar offenders, both in prison and upon their release from incarceration. In an attempt to investigate these issues and address the special sensitivity hypothesis, the current study utilizes a male sample of incarcerated federal corrections inmates to explore differences between white-collar and street offenders. Specifically, demographic and social characteristics, as well as those involving attitudes, motivations, self-control, and personality attributes are examined among a male-only sample of prisoners incarcerated for white-collar offenses and non-white-collar offenses. Moreover, the current study examines the hypothesis that white-collar offenders are somehow more sensitive to the pains of imprisonment than offenders of the non-white-collar variety. The subsequent prison experiences of these offenders is examined and measured through a variety of prison adjustment measures during the course of their prison stay. Finally, implications of the findings are discussed with respect to how the justice and correctional systems may be affected by, and how they choose to respond to, white-collar offending populations with different management, supervision, and treatment strategies. Details: Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati, School of Criminal Justice, 2010. 216p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 14, 2011 at: http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=ucin1281991890 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=ucin1281991890 Shelf Number: 121000 Keywords: InmatesPrisonersPrisonizationWhite-Collar CrimeWhite-Collar Offenders |
Author: Van Slyke, Shanna Title: Social Identification and Public Opinion on White-Collar Crime Summary: White-collar crime accounts for billions of dollars in annual losses but traditionally has been viewed as less serious and less deserving of harsh punishment compared with street crime. This pattern can be observed in public opinion surveys, law-enforcement resource allocations, and criminal justice system sanctioning. Scholars usually distinguish between different types of white-collar crime — bitterly noting the irony that broadened definitions of white-collar crime have perpetuated status-based disparities the very concept was designed to bring to light. Some of these scholars, particularly those study public perceptions, have begun to question the conventional wisdom of widespread public apathy toward the crimes of U.S. economic and political elites. They have pointed at Watergate in the 1970s, the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the wave of national corporate financial failures emerging in 2001–2002, and they have proposed that public outrage stemming from these widely publicized political and economic scandals should serve as a catalyst for sentencing reform that would more accurately tailor punishments to the harms caused. Lengthy prison sentences given to corporate executives and chairman—such as Bernie Madoff’s June 2009 150-year prison sentence—seem to support the argument that a national attitudinal shift has translated into more severe punishments for white-collar offenders. But one could characterize recent severe white-collar sentences—most notably in this regard, Shalom Weiss’s 840-year prison term — as aberrations that are both expressively powerful and functionally indistinguishable from a life sentence with no chance of parole. As such, far from bridging the gap between harm and punishment, these extreme reactions would also fail to represent the majority of white-collar offenders’ experiences with the criminal justice system. Despite financial losses stemming from white-collar crime, most white-collar offenders are not prosecuted as criminal offenders and do not comprise the bulk of U.S. jail and prison populations. The present study addresses this paradox between harm caused, perceived seriousness and desired punitiveness, and the theoretical void in the white-collar crime literature by incorporating the concepts of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility from the social psychological literature on social identity theory. The study’s purposes, then, are to determine whether there are observable differences in punitiveness toward white-collar and street offenders and then to test the applicability of the proposed integrated theory to explaining punitiveness by employing a representative telephone survey of 400 Floridian adults in 2008. The survey tested 10 hypotheses in several ways: An offense- and an offender-based definition of white-collar crime is used as well as nonviolent economic street crime, incarceration and disenfranchisement support serve as dependent variables; and two forms of offender identification (social and racial) and two forms of threats (offense seriousness and victim identification) are assessed. Incarceration support is modeled for six offenses: elite white-collar crime (corporate fraud and government bribery), consumer fraud white-collar crimes (false advertising and car sales fraud), and nonviolent economic street crimes (motor vehicle theft and burglary). The six offenses were then collapsed into three crime categories designed to represent three basic social status groups and to address the white-collar crime definitional debate: elite white-collar crime (high-status white-collar crime), consumer fraud white-collar crime (middle-status white-collar crime), and nonviolent economic street crime (low-status non-white-collar crime). No violent street crimes were included to enhance the comparability between the street crimes and white-collar crimes; likewise, the selected street crimes were economically motivated so they would also have the same basic motive (unlike non-violent street crimes like vandalism or drug use). Bivariate correlations revealed differences in public opinion, but the definition of white-collar crime (i.e., offense or offender based) and the measure of punitiveness (i.e., support for incarceration and for disenfranchisement) impacted the results. Multivariate logistic regression results indicate that offense seriousness had the consistent effect on increasing punitiveness for street crimes, but rarely influenced punishment recommendations for white-collar crimes—particularly those of the powerful corporate and government elites. However, little support emerged supporting the hypotheses derived from social identity theory. Rarely have past studies identified variables that are related to punitiveness toward white-collar offenders, be they theoretical or control variables. The present study, on the other hand, drew from the available research literature, identified the theoretical concept of social identification, and empirically tested this concept’s association with incarceration and disenfranchisement recommendations for white-collar and street property offenders. Social identification was not always related to punitiveness; moreover, the hypothesized positive effect of social identification interacting with perceived seriousness failed to materialize. Yet social identification itself increased punitiveness in several models and this is an advancement of our knowledge about public opinion on white-collar crime—albeit an advancement in need of refinement. Theoretically, this study introduced the idea of social identity to the study of white-collar crime, a phenomenon that has long been anecdotally characterized as crime by seemingly normal and respectable individuals, but which has recently exhibited signs of increased governmental intervention and sanctioning. The unexpected findings were explained by drawing upon labeling theory and by discussing the differential roles of information in influencing punitive attitudes. A different causal model is then suggested wherein strength of incriminating evidence is predicted to moderate the effect of social identification on punitiveness toward white-collar offenders. In this revised model to be tested in future research, social identification is not predicted to interact with seriousness to influence punitiveness; rather, it is hypothesized to influence punitiveness indirectly through its influence on perceptions of guilt. The conclusion focuses upon the contradiction between the U.S. government’s relative neglect of white-collar crime and contemporary empirical evidence on public punitiveness toward white-collar and street offenders. Bernie Madoff’s recent 150-year is revisited, and it is concluded that recent examples of harsh white-collar crime sanctioning do not reflect a significant shift in attitudes. Instead, returning to social identity theory, it is proposed that certain offenders have gotten singled out in order to for the government send a symbolic message of intolerance toward corporate crime while at the same time, the criminogenic opportunity and motivation structures of U.S. finance capitalism are left untouched and ineffectively regulated, thus perpetuating the problem of white-collar crime. Details: Tallahassee: Florida State University, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2009. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 17, 2011 at: http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-10272009-160114/ Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-10272009-160114/ Shelf Number: 122424 Keywords: Consumer FraudPublic AttitudesPublic OpinionPunishmentWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the United States Marshals Service Complex Asset Team Managment and Oversight Summary: The Department of Justice (DOJ) may seize and then compel forfeiture of assets used in or acquired through illegal activity. Such assets may include cash, bank accounts, vehicles, jewelry, stocks, real estate and operating businesses. The United States Marshals Service (USMS) Asset Forfeiture Division manages and disposes of properties seized and forfeited by federal investigative agencies and U.S. Attorneys nationwide. As of March 2011, the USMS held seized assets estimated to be worth over $3.8 billion, with cash and other financial instruments comprising about 93 percent of these assets’ estimated value. The Complex Asset Team within the Asset Forfeiture Division works with USMS district personnel to help secure, appraise, and dispose of assets requiring specialized commercial expertise, including operating businesses, complicated financial instruments, and large commercial real estate properties. In recent years, the size and complexity of the Complex Asset Team’s asset portfolio have grown with the greater sophistication of multimillion-dollar financial crimes – such as those perpetrated by high-profile, white-collar criminals including Bernard Madoff – that yield forfeitable assets. Mismanagement of these complex seized assets can diminish the value of seized assets, result in excessive asset management costs, and expose the government to lengthy litigation with potential claimants. Any improprieties associated with asset forfeitures also can generate public distrust that can undermine the legitimacy of asset forfeiture as a tool for combating crime. The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recently conducted an investigation into an allegation that Leonard Briskman, the lead career official with the Complex Asset Team, owned a private appraisal business that presented a conflict of interest with his official USMS duties, which involved valuing and selling assets. The investigation did not substantiate the allegation made against Briskman, but concerns about potential irregularities in the USMS’s management of complex assets prompted the OIG to conduct this audit of Complex Asset Team operations between 2005 and 2010. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2011. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Report 11-42: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/USMS/a1142r.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/USMS/a1142r.pdf Shelf Number: 122778 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture (U.S.)U.S. Marshals ServiceWhite-Collar CrimeWhite-Collar Offenses |
Author: Ramiriz, Mary Kreiner Title: Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime Summary: Recent financial scandals and the relative paucity of criminal prosecutions against elite actors that benefited from the crisis in response suggest a new reality in the criminal law system: some wrongful actors appear to be above the law and immune from criminal prosecution. As such, the criminal prosecutorial system affirms much of the wrongdoing giving rise to the crisis. This leaves the same elites undisturbed at the apex of the financial sector, and creates perverse incentives for any successors. Their incumbency in power results in massive deadweight losses due to the distorted incentives they now face. Further, this undermines the legitimacy of the rule of law and encourages even more lawlessness among the entire population, as the declination of prosecution advertises the profitability of crime. These considerations transcend deterrence as well as retribution as a traditional basis for criminal punishment. Affirmance is far more costly and dangerous with respect to the crimes of powerful elites that control large organizations than can be accounted for under traditional notions of deterrence. Few limits are placed on a prosecutor’s discretionary decision about whom to prosecute, and many factors against prosecution take hold, especially in resource-intensive white collar crime prosecutions. This article asserts that prosecutors should not decline prosecution in these circumstances without considering its potential affirmance of crime. Otherwise, the profitability of crime promises massive future losses. Details: Topeka, KS: Washington University School of Law, 2012. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2039785 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2039785 Shelf Number: 125404 Keywords: Elite CrimeFinancial CrimesProsecutorial DiscretionPunishmentWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Markoff, Gabriel H. Title: Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century Summary: The conventional wisdom states that prosecuting corporations can subject them to terrible collateral consequences that risk putting them out of business and causing massive social and economic harm. Under this viewpoint, which has come to dominate the literature following the demise of Arthur Andersen after that firm’s prosecution in the wake of the Enron scandal, even a criminal indictment can be a “corporate death penalty.” The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has implicitly accepted this view by declining to prosecute many large companies in favor of using criminal settlements called deferred prosecution agreements, or “DPAs.” Yet, there is no evidence to support the existence of the “Andersen Effect” and the much-hyped corporate death penalty. Indeed, no one has ever empirically studied what happens to companies after conviction. In this Article, I do just that. Using the database of organizational convictions made publicly available by Professor Brandon Garrett, I find that no publicly traded company failed because of a conviction in the years 2001–2010. Moreover, many convictions included plea agreements imposing compliance programs that advocates have pointed to as a key justification for using DPAs. Because corporate convictions do not have the terrible consequences they were assumed to have, and because they can be used to obtain compliance programs just as DPAs can, the DOJ should prosecute more lawbreaking companies and reserve DPAs for extraordinary circumstances. In the absence of some other justification for using DPAs, the DOJ should exploit the stronger deterrent value of corporate prosecution to its full capacity. Details: Social Science Research Network, 2012. 47p. Source: Working Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2012 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2143925_code1710157.pdf?abstractid=2132242&mirid=1 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2143925_code1710157.pdf?abstractid=2132242&mirid=1 Shelf Number: 126343 Keywords: ConvictionsCorporate CrimeCorporate Death PenaltyProsecutionWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Stickeler, Charles Nickolas Title: A Deadly Way of Doing Business: A Case Study of Corporate Crime in the Coal Mining Industry Summary: To this point, research on corporate crime has been, for the most part, overlooked by mainstream criminology. In particular, corporate violations of safety regulations in the coal mining industry have yet to be studied within the field of criminology. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the crimes of a coal mining corporation, a corporation whose business decisions led to the worst coal mining disaster in forty years, along with the deaths of twenty-nine men. This thesis will utilize a case study format in order to illustrate the crimes committed by this corporation. Previous literature covering the history of coal mining safety in the United States, the political economy of coal, and theoretical explanations of corporate crime will be reviewed. The crimes detailed in this case study will then be explained using Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory. The criminal liability of corporations, potential ways to reduce corporate crime in the coal mining industry, as well as limitations of this study and directions for future research in this area will also be discussed. Details: University of South Florida, 2012. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 23, 2012 at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5427&context=etd Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5427&context=etd Shelf Number: 126951 Keywords: Coal Mining IndustryCorporate Crime (U.S.)Criminal LiabilityDisastersWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Levi, Michael Title: eCrime Reduction Partnership Mapping Study Summary: High quality data on eCrimes are hard to find, both nationally and internationally. This makes rational policy decisions for both public and private sectors – which anyway are interdependent in both directions – even more difficult than they would otherwise be, as nation states grapple falteringly with transnational crimes and with transnational legal processes, priorities and scarce resources. • The majority of eCrime data collection practices adopt sub-standard methodologies that produce a very partial picture of the problem. Large government surveys, such as the Crime Survey for England and Wales (formerly the British Crime Survey), the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey and Commercial Victimisation Survey only intermittently include questions that relate directly to eCrimes, though the CSEW and the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey have looked regularly at card and identity crimes, and fear of them, and have found that identity thefts arouse more concern than do other crimes. Identity thefts can occur offline, but it seems plausible that when responding, people will be thinking about online data ‘theft’ from hacking or social engineering. eCrime questions in European surveys, such as the Community Surveys on ICT Usage, have been found to be unreliable. Vendor sources, such as private security surveys, are often based on breach data identified by vendor software, resulting in partial datasets. Official criminal justice related datasets rely on both reported and officially recorded incidents of eCrimes, while even good administrative data in the private sector (e.g. UK Payments, CIFAS Fraud Prevention Service) cannot avoid excluding unidentified eFrauds (for example in the large category of ‘bad debt’). In the UK only the Oxford Internet Surveys and the Information Security Breaches Survey (pre-2010) produce eCrimes data that are of gold-standard methodologically: however neither of them survey or estimate direct or indirect economic losses from eCrimes. • The introduction of security breach notification requirements to some UK public and private sector organisations in May 20111 may provide a more robust evidence base on eCrimes breaches. It is however too early to assess the quality of this new data stream that is only recently under the coordination of the Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). • Based on the best data available, an upward trend is evident for both domestic and business related eCrimes. The Information Security Breaches Survey (2010) indicates a sharp upward trend in all business eCrimes compared to 2008 data. While less extreme, the upward trend in domestic data as recorded by the Oxford Internet Survey (2011) applies to all eCrimes other than obscenity. • Independent of actual levels of fraud, there is high public anxiety about eCrimes, and such anxieties require ‘reassurance policing’ that contains both real responses to experienced crimes and a range of public and third party measures to guide sound as well as just profitable risk-reduction practices. Details: Cardiff, Wales: Cardiff Centre for Crime, Law and Justice Cardiff School of Social Sciences, 2012. 85p. Source: Iinternet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2012 at: http://dpalliance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/20120910-eCrime_Reduction_Partnership_Mapping_Study.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://dpalliance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/20120910-eCrime_Reduction_Partnership_Mapping_Study.pdf Shelf Number: 127027 Keywords: Computer Crime (U.K.)Computer FraudCrime SurveysIdentity TheftVictimization SurveysWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Bucy, Pamela H. Title: RICO Trends: From Gangsters to Class Actions Summary: This article addresses the question: why isn’t RICO used much? RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, both a crime and a civil cause of action, was passed in 1970 with much fanfare. The fanfare was deserved. RICO was an imaginative criminal justice initiative aimed at complex, systemic crime. RICO’s civil cause of action was viewed as a robust tool for plaintiffs and a vital supplement to strained law enforcement resources. After conducting an in-depth analysis of RICO opinions, reported and unreported, rendered by the federal appellate courts during the seven year time period from 2005-2011, this article has an answer to the question. Criminal RICO’s time has come and gone, but civil RICO’s potential has not yet been realized. This article focuses on recent developments in case law that make civil RICO with regard to class actions, and in the pharmaceutical fraud area, newly viable. The data analyzed in this article suggests that criminal RICO is anachronistic. Simpler, more streamlined statutes are now available to achieve, far more easily than RICO, the benefits RICO used to uniquely bestow: providing context for isolated acts, linking far-flung actors, penetrating organizations to reach key players, stiff sentences, obtaining forfeiture of property used to commit crime and reaped from crime. Civil RICO, on the other hand, is an untapped resource. Used properly, civil RICO is an optimal private attorney general tool and a boon for plaintiffs. This is true for two reasons. First, RICO mandates treble damages at a time when, because of court rulings and legislative actions, many plaintiffs are limited to little more than single damages. Second, in light of recent court rulings in RICO cases, RICO’s elements dovetail with class action requirements of commonality and predominance, making RICO class actions newly viable. This article proceeds in eight parts. Part I provides an overview of the RICO statute. Part II explains the methodology used to gather the data in this study. Part III discusses quantitative measurements from the data including how many RICO cases are decided each year and where they are brought. Part IV describes the types of RICO cases brought under both criminal and civil RICO provisions. Part V examines the issues that have dominated RICO court decisions from 2005-2011. Part V discusses how recent court decisions on issues of “enterprise,” proximate causation and “pattern” make civil RICO cases easier than ever to plead and prove. Part VI analyzes the outcome in RICO cases including who wins, who loses, and which circuits favor which side. Part VII focuses on RICO class actions discussing past and future trends, successes, and failures. Part VIII focuses on pharmaceutical fraud cases, noting why they are especially ripe for use of civil RICO. Details: Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama School of Law, 2012. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2179211: Accessed January 17, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179211 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179211 Shelf Number: 127282 Keywords: Business FraudFraudOrganized Crime (U.S.)Pharmaceutical FraudRacketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ActWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Button, Mark Title: Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions. Main Report Summary: This research was commissioned by the Midlands Fraud Forum, Eversheds and PKF with the aim to ‘assess how sanctions are used against fraudsters and how this can be made easier so as to maximise deterrence.’ Fraud is becoming much more transparent in society as a problem that causes significant harm. The recent National Fraud Authority’s Annual Fraud Indicator estimate of a £73 billion1 problem establishes it as, in all probability, the most expensive crime to UK Plc. There is also evidence that some criminals are moving from traditional acquisitive crime to fraud. Clearly more needs to be done to reduce fraud, and sanctions form an important element of that strategy. There has been interest in sanctions for fraud and related areas in recent years in Government backed reviews and strategies2. However, academic research in this area has been sparse and tended to focus upon specific types of fraud3. This research addresses some of that gap by delving deeper into the sanctions used to counter fraud. The aim was to look for inspiration from a range of other sectors, with a view to making recommendations for the more effective use of sanctions against fraudsters, building upon some of the other work undertaken in this area. The report is based upon documentary research, 39 interviews drawn from organisations across the criminal and civil justice systems, public and private sectors. Additionally a survey was also conducted for this research which secured 397 responses. This is the summary report and full findings can be found in the main report (“the Report”) and survey report documents. Details: Portsmouth, UK: Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, University of Portsmouth, 2012. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/centreforcounterfraudstudies/documents/filetodownload,161060,en.tmp Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/centreforcounterfraudstudies/documents/filetodownload,161060,en.tmp Shelf Number: 128913 Keywords: Business CrimesCorporate Fraud (U.K.)Criminal SanctionsFinancial CrimesWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Simpson, Sally S. Title: Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review Summary: BACKGROUND Corporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective strategies to prevent and control it. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite's definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is "the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law." Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance. OBJECTIVES Our overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategiesi.e., the actions and programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate crime. We then assess the impact of these strategies on individual and company offending. Included are legal and administrative interventions such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non-punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES We were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: experimental (e.g., lab studies or vignette surveys), quasi-experimental (e.g., pre/post-tests), and non-experimental (e.g., correlational statistics using secondary data). The studies included also contained a wide variety of data (e.g., data from official agencies, corporate reports, individuals' survey responses, etc.). Our search included published and unpublished articles, reports, documents, and other readily available sources. The outcome of interest, corporate offending, could reflect actual behavior or behavioral intentions as reported by respondents. Out of the 40 possible treatment categories, we were able to calculate a mean effect size for 19. Although most showed a positive albeit non-significant treatment effect, some (including a significant effect) were iatrogenic. Looking at the specific mechanisms, the impact of law on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and geographical level of analysis (there was not enough data to calculate effect sizes for individuals). However, this finding is limited to cross-sectional studies. For punitive sanctions, where there was substantially more data from which to calculate effect sizes, we observe a similar pattern: A tendency toward deterrence across units of analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether data are cross-sectional or longitudinal. The one area where there appears to be a consistent treatment effect is in the area of regulatory policy, but only at the individual level. Effects for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and others iatrogenic) and none are statistically significant. Regarding moderator effects, the least methodologically rigorous designs those that were not experimental versus experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls were associated with a treatment effect. We also found that older studies were associated with stronger deterrent effectsperhaps because the older studies are less methodologically rigorous that those that are newer. Other moderator results were less clear (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; offense type), but given how few of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall we think it is premature to draw any conclusions from these findings and call instead for more methodologically rigorous and focused studies particularly in the punitive sanction and regulatory policy areas. Details: Oslo: Campbell Collaboration, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Campbell Systematic Review 2014:4: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Shelf Number: 132243 Keywords: Corporate CrimeCrime PreventionDeterrenceFinancial CrimeFraudWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Cohen, Mark A. Title: Willingness to Pay to Reduce White Collar and Corporate Crime Summary: Consumer protection and financial regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) regulate various types of consumer, investor and financial frauds. Whether required or not, rulemaking proceedings oftentimes include some form of cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the benefits of proposed regulations - whether fully quantified or not - are an increasingly important component of rulemaking decisions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the impact on victims in some cases include significant time and financial hardships and even pain, suffering and reduced quality of life. Further, the existence of these offenses causes non-victims to take costly precautionary behavior and might even inhibit legitimate business activities. Yet, little is known about the true costs of consumer and financial crimes other than the out-of-pocket monetary losses incurred by victims. To the extent society wishes to optimally deter such crimes, without better data on nonmonetary costs, any cost-benefit analyses of criminal justice or prevention programs designed to reduce these crimes will inevitably underestimate program benefits. This paper provides an initial framework and empirical estimates of the willingness-to-pay to reduce four types of white collar and corporate offenses - consumer fraud, financial fraud, corporate crime and corporate financial crime. Utilizing a contingent valuation survey approached that has been used to estimate the cost of street crimes, the average willingness to pay for a 10% reduction in each of these four offenses is estimated to range between $70 and $75 per household. In the case of consumer fraud and financial fraud - where estimates of prevalence are available, this translates into a willingness to pay of $2,700 per consumer fraud and $21,000 for financial fraud. In contrast, the out-of-pocket costs to victims of consumer fraud have been estimated to average about $100, and about $200 to $250 for various types of financial frauds. These figures also compare favorably to the willingness to pay for a reduced household burglary of $18,000. Details: Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Law School; Resources for the Future: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486220 Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486220 Shelf Number: 133299 Keywords: Consumer Fraud (U.S.)Consumer ProtectionCorporate CrimeFinancial CrimesFinancial FraudWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: KPMG Title: Global profiles of the fraudster: White-collar crime -- present and future Summary: Fraud specialists have long debated whether it is possible to develop a profile of a fraudster that is accurate enough to enable organizations to catch people in the act of fraud or even beforehand. The prediction of a crime before it occurs is, at least for now, the subject of science fiction. But an analysis of the constantly changing nature of fraud and the fraudster can help organizations stiffen their defenses against these criminal activities. Forewarned is forearmed. Global profiles of the fraudster contains KPMG International's analysis of 596 fraudsters member firms investigated between 2011 and 2013 with insights into the relationship between the attributes of fraudsters, their motivations and the environments in which they flourish. KPMG International gathered data from fraud investigations conducted by KPMG member firms' forensic specialists in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMA), the Americas, and Asia-Pacific regions between August 2011 and February 2013. The survey examined 'white-collar' crime investigations conducted across the three regions where we were able to identify the perpetrator and could provide detailed contextual information on the crime. We have developed a series of themes in order to understand the changing relationship among the fraudster, his/her environment and the frauds committed. And after taking into account the insights of our investigation leaders around the world, we conclude that the type of fraud and the type of fraudster are continually changing. Details: Zurich, SWIT: KPMG, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster/Documents/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster-v2.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster/Documents/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster-v2.pdf Shelf Number: 133560 Keywords: Crimes Against BusinessesFinancial CrimesFraudWhite-Collar CrimeWhite-Collar Offenses |
Author: Hong, Harrison Title: Crime, Punishment and the Halo Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Summary: Three reasons are often cited for the value of corporate social responsibility: product quality signalling, delegated giving, and the halo effect. Previous tests cannot separate these channels because they focus on consumers, who value all three. We focus on prosecutors, who are only susceptible to the halo effect. Using Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcements, we find that social responsibility is associated with 2 million dollars less in fines, though it is uncorrelated with bribe characteristics and cooperation, which should entirely determine sanctions following Becker (1974). We show that this bias is likely a halo effect and not prosecutorial conflict of interest. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper 21215: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21215.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21215.pdf Shelf Number: 135837 Keywords: Corporate Crime Economics of Crime Financial Crimes Prosecutor White-Collar Crime |
Author: Artavanis, Nikolaos Title: Tax Evasion across Industries: Soft Credit Evidence from Greece Summary: We document that in semiformal economies, banks lend to tax-evading individuals based on the bank's assessment of the individual's true income. This observation leads to a novel approach to estimate tax evasion. We use microdata on household credit from a Greek bank, and replicate the bank underwriting model to infer the banks estimate of individuals' true income. We estimate that 43%-45% of self-employed income goes unreported and thus untaxed. For 2009, this implies 28.2 billion euros of unreported income, implying foregone tax revenues of over 11 billion euros or 30% of the deficit. Our method innovation allows for estimating the industry distribution of tax evasion in settings where uncovering the incidence of hidden cash transactions is difficult using other methods. Primary tax-evading industries are professional services - medicine, law, engineering, education, and media. We conclude with evidence that contemplates the importance of institutions, paper trail and political willpower for the persistence of tax evasion. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper No. 21552: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21552 Year: 2015 Country: Greece URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21552 Shelf Number: 136778 Keywords: Financial CrimesTax EvasionWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Sharma, Saswot Raj Title: Terrorist, White Collar and Organized Crime Financing Case Study and Forensic Audit Summary: Terrorism, white collar crime and organized crime usually are inevitable fact and black truth on human civilization. They need funds for operation and all the illicit money gathered cannot be used for operation until and unless it is cleaned by the means on Money laundering. Money laundering usually occurs in three steps: Placement is the transfer of illegal activities' proceeds into financial systems without attracting the attention of financial institutions and government authorities. Money launderers accomplish this by dividing their tainted cash into small sums and executing transactions that fall beneath banks' regulatory reporting levels. Layering is the process of generating a series of transactions in order to distance the proceeds from their illegal source and to obfuscate the audit trail. Common layering techniques include outbound electronic funds transfers, usually directly or subsequently into a - bank secrecy haven,- or a jurisdiction with lax recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and withdrawals of already placed deposits in the form of highly liquid monetary instruments, such as money orders or travelers checks. Integration, the final money laundering stage, is the unnoticed reinsertion of successfully laundered, untraceable proceeds into an economy. This is accomplished through a variety of spending, investing and lending techniques and cross-border, seemingly legitimate transactions. Independent auditors have a responsibility under SAS no. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, to be aware of the possibility that illegal acts may have occurred, indirectly affecting amounts recorded in an entity's financial statements. If an accountant believes the consequences of the money laundering have not been properly accounted for or disclosed on the financial statements, SAS 54 states that the auditor should Criminal Financing Forensic Audit 5 Saswot Raj Sharma /ICAI/ Feb 14 express a qualified or adverse opinion on the financial statements. If the client refuses to accept the auditor's modified report, the auditor should resign. Punishment: Generally internationally the punishment is usually as follows: (a) A person who finances in terrorist activities shall be punished by an imprisonment up to five years and a fine equal to the amount used in offence and where such amount is not identified up to five hundred thousand rupees. (b) A person who commits money laundering offence under Chapter-2 of the AMLA except one mentioned in Sub-Section (1) shall be punished by an imprisonment between one and four years and a fine equal to the amount used in the offence. (c) An additional punishment of ten percent shall be awarded where a public official or the chief or official of a bank, financial institution or non-financial institution is involved in the offence. Details: Kirtipur, Nepal: Tribhuvan University, 2014. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Shelf Number: 137580 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist FinancingWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Arlen, Jennifer Title: Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution Summary: Over the last decade, federal corporate criminal enforcement policy has undergone a significant transformation. Firms that commit crimes are no longer simply required to pay fines. Instead, prosecutors and firms enter into pretrial diversion agreements (PDAs). Prosecutors regularly use PDAs to impose mandates on firms creating new duties that alter firms' internal operations or governance structures. This Article evaluates PDA mandates to determine whether and when prosecutors can appropriately use them to deter corporate crime. We find that mandates can be justified. But, contrary to DOJ policy favoring mandates for any firm with a deficient compliance program at the time of the crime, we find that mandates should be imposed more selectively. Specifically, mandates are only appropriate if a firm is plagued by "policing agency costs" - in that the firm's managers did not act to deter or report wrongdoing because they benefitted personally from tolerating wrongdoing or from deficient corporate policing. We show that this policing agency cost justification provides guidance on how to reform federal policy to make appropriate use of mandates, guidance which reveals that many mandates are inappropriate. Details: New York: New York University School of Law, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-04 ; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-06 : Accessed February 25, 2016 at: Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: Over the last decade, federal corporate criminal enforcement policy has undergone a significant transformation. Firms that commit crimes are no longer simply required to pay fines. Instead, prosecutors and firms enter into pr Shelf Number: 137960 Keywords: Corporate CrimeFinancial CrimesWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Bromberg, Lev Title: Sanctions Imposed for Insider Trading in Australia, , Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States: An Empirical Study Summary: This working paper presents the results of a detailed comparative empirical study of sanctions imposed for insider trading in Australia, Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Insider trading is considered to be a serious form of misconduct and has in some cases resulted in defendants receiving lengthy custodial sentences and significant monetary sanctions. The comparative study is based on a dataset of a significant size, scope and comprehensiveness, encompassing nearly 700 individuals and companies, as well as approximately 1400 sanctions imposed for the contravention of insider trading provisions in the seven jurisdictions. The study provides a detailed analysis of the insider trading enforcement landscape across a range of common law jurisdictions over an extended period by examining custodial sentences, banning orders and various pecuniary sanctions imposed for insider trading during the seven year period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2015 Details: Melbourne: University of Melbourne - Law School; Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: CIFR Paper No. 117/2016 : Accessed September 15, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817172 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817172 Shelf Number: 147881 Keywords: Financial CrimeInsider TradingWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Chiarini, Bruno Title: Is the Severity of the Penalty an Effective Deterrent? A Strategic Approach for the Crime of Tax Evasion Summary: In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will alter the payoff of the individuals involved, leaving unchanged the frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be simply read with mixed strategies. These are inconclusive on how the players act rationally. This is undeniably true for the crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering the risk of breaking the law. Although an irreducible minimum of uncertainty remains, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies provides us with the necessary information on equilibria in pure strategies that will be played. In this context, tougher sentencing deters crime, although, as the Italian historical experience teaches, the necessary condition required is the certainty of punishment and the ability of the government to enforce it. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute (CESifo, 2016. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 6112: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6112.html Year: 2016 Country: Italy URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6112.html Shelf Number: 145894 Keywords: DeterrenceFinancial CrimePunishmentTax EvasionWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Ghazi-Tehrani, Adam Kavon Title: Corporate Crime and State Legitimacy: Non-Issue Making in The 2008 Chinese Melamine Milk Scandal Summary: While the study of corporate crime began nearly seventy years ago, academic access to Asian countries, and China in particular, has become available only in the past two decades. The growing economic crime rate in China remains a difficult area of research, but recent studies demonstrate the impact China's economic reform on crime in general. This study aims to apply western corporate crime and state theories to China in an effort to explain both China's economic crime rate and the government's response. This qualitative study draws on information about the 2008 melamine milk scandal from both Chinese and western newspapers, as well as scholarly journals. An analysis of these sources reveals China is similar to the United States of America and other developed nations: economic crime is tolerated if that crime provides a direct benefit for the offending corporation and indirect benefit for the state. China's authoritarian government increases this tolerance as the state is able to both censor the media and use force to prevent social movements, liberties that have a dampening effect on economic crime in western democracies. This implies that without a liberalization of government to match the liberalization of economy, China's economic crime rate will remain high. Details: Irvine, CA: University of California, Irvine, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2016 at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0gn810gj Year: 2012 Country: China URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0gn810gj Shelf Number: 145781 Keywords: Corporate CrimeEconomic CrimesWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Australia. Senate. Economics References Committee Title: 'Lifting the fear and suppressing the greed': Penalties for white-collar crime and corporate and financial misconduct in Australia Summary: n 25 November 2015, the Senate referred the matter of inconsistencies and inadequacies of current criminal, civil and administrative penalties for corporate and financial misconduct or white-collar crime to the Economics References Committee for inquiry and report. The terms of reference were as follows: (a) evidentiary standards across various acts and instruments; (b) the use and duration of custodial sentences; (c) the use and duration of banning orders; (d) the value of fine and other monetary penalties, particularly in proportion to the amount of wrongful gains; (e) the availability and use of mechanisms to recover wrongful gains; (f) penalties used in other countries, particularly members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]; and (g) any other relevant matters. Details: Canberra: Australia Parliament, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/economic_references_ctee_lifting_the_fear_march_2017report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/economic_references_ctee_lifting_the_fear_march_2017report.pdf Shelf Number: 144727 Keywords: Corporate CrimeFinancial CrimesWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: McLain, Andrea Title: Organized Group Activity in Insurance Fraud: 2008-June 2012 Summary: According to NICB, organized crime group generate millions of dollars annually through fraudulent insurance schemes within the US. NICB defines organized crime groups as "any specific group made up of entities and/or individuals who systematically and repeatedly conduct pre-planned activities for the purpose of generating fraudulent insurance schemes". In this NICB ForeCAST Report, a quantitative analysis of organized crime in insurance fraud was conducted with the use of the Organized Group/Ring Activity (OGA) Referral Reason. When NICB member companies refer claims to the NICB Questionable Claims, the submission may include up to 7 Referral Reasons. As the OGA Referral Reason is an indicator of the possible involvement of organized crime in insurance fraud, all Questionable Claims (QCs) that were referred between 2008 and June 30, 2012, regardless of Date of Loss (DOL), with OGA as any one of the seven potential Referral Reasons were pulled from ISO ClaimSearch. Results in which almost all fields were left blank were removed from this study. It is important to also note that ISO ClaimSearch is a multifaceted database where different insurance companies are continually inputting new information. Standards, procedures, or practices relating to the identification of fraud, the selection of referral reasons, and the submission of QCs in ISO ClaimSearch may not be completely uniform between NICB member companies. This ForeCAST is organized into 2 sections: "The Scope of the Problem" and "Insurance Classifications". "The Scope of the Problem" includes analyses of OGA QCs by: Year, Month, Loss State, and Loss City. "Insurance Classifications" discuss the descriptive fields pertaining to insurance lines of business. Sections under "Insurance Classifications" include analysis of OGA QCs by: Policy Type, Loss Type, and OGA QC additional Referral Reasons. Throughout a majority of the tables, figures, and analyses of this report, totals are calculated from 2008 through June 2012 and appear in "Red", all percentage changes are calculated from 2008 through 2011 (unless specified otherwise) and appear in "Blue", and all information regarding the first half of 2012 is followed by an asterisk as a reminder that it is incomplete data. Also, all percents were rounded to the nearest whole number. Exactly 13,014 QCs were identified with the OGA referral reason in ISO ClaimSearch from 2008 through June 2012. In summary, the analysis of OGA QC referral submissions from 2008 through June 2012 yielded the following results: The number of OGA QC referrals per referral year has increased by 47% from 2008 to 2011, and is likely to continue on par from 2011 to 2012 despite a decrease from 2010 to 2011. OGA QCs were referred at a rate of 8 per day. Florida was the state with both the most OGA QC referral submissions by volume and the highest rate of OGA QCs per 100,000 persons. Notably, the city with the most OGA QCs was Los Angeles, CA, followed by New York, NY. The vast majority of OGA QCs were referred on personal automobile policies where the loss involved bodily injury, personal injury protection, or collision. Lastly, the Referral Reason that was selected in combination with the OGA referral reason most often was Staged/Caused Accident. Details: Des Plaines, IL: National Insurance Crime Bureau, 2012. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2017 at: https://www.nicb.org/newsroom/news-releases/organized-crime-and-insurance-fraud Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.nicb.org/newsroom/news-releases/organized-crime-and-insurance-fraud Shelf Number: 147391 Keywords: Insurance FraudOrganized CrimeWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Longino, Chris Title: Organized Crime in Insurance Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Staged Automobile Accident Rings Summary: The growing trend of insurance fraud continues to cost US consumers billions of dollars a year through increased premiums. In 2015, the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud estimated the cost of insurance fraud as being at least $80 billion dollars a year. Even though an increasing number of criminals are drawn to the low risk, high reward of insurance fraud, little criminological literature has explored this topic and the public remains relatively unaware of the extent of the problem. One alarming aspect of insurance fraud is the involvement of organized criminal groups. These organized criminal enterprises are formed for the sole purpose of defrauding the insurance industry. Often, these enterprises are believed to have ties to traditional organized criminal groups, such as the Italian Mafia or the Russian Mob. In order to combat these criminal organizations, it is important to understand the behavior and motivation of such groups. The present study aims to analyze the generally held belief throughout the insurance industry that organized insurance fraud rings are more likely to operate in states with mandatory Personal Injury Protection (PIP) policies. This analysis was conducted by examining staged automobile accidents reported to the National Insurance Crime Bureau. The results of this analysis were mixed. Although a larger percentage of states with mandatory PIP displayed higher staged accident rate, some mandatory PIP states did not, and multiple non-PIP states also demonstrated a high staged accident rate. In an attempt to better understand this crime, further criminological research is needed. Details: Tampa: University of South Florida, 2015. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 19, 2017 at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5731/ Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5731/ Shelf Number: 147392 Keywords: Automobile Accidents Insurance Fraud Organized Crime White-Collar Crime |
Author: Lederman, Leandra Title: The Fraud Triangle and Tax Evasion Summary: The "fraud triangle" is the preeminent framework for analyzing fraud in the accounting literature. It is a theory of why some people commit fraud, developed out of studies of individuals, including inmates convicted of criminal trust violations. The three components of the fraud triangle are generally considered to be (1) an incentive or pressure (usually financial), (2) opportunity, and (3) rationalization. There is a separate, extensive legal literature on tax compliance and evasion. Yet the fraud triangle is largely absent from this legal literature, although tax evasion is a type of fraud. This article rectifies that oversight, analyzing how the fraud triangle-and its expanded version, the "fraud diamond"-can inform the legal literature on tax compliance. The article argues that the fraud triangle can provide a frame that brings together distinct tax compliance theories discussed in the legal literature, the traditional economic (deterrence) model and behavioral theories focusing on such things as social norms or tax morale. Details: Bloomington, IN: Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, 2019. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper no. 398: Accessed May 14, 2019 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339558 Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339558 Shelf Number: 155836 Keywords: Financial Crime Fraud Fraud Triangle Tax Evasion White-Collar Crime |